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ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for 
Industrial Demonstration) has the objective to integrate 
innovative options with the objective to prepare the 4th 
generation reactors. 
 
In this framework a French-Japanese agreement was 
signed in 2014 between CEA, framatome (ex AREVA NP), 
JAEA, MHI/MFBR to jointly perform components design 
of ASTRID such as Decay Heat Removal Systems 
(DHRS).  
In this respect an ambitious close collaboration is set in 
the framework of the practical elimination objective of 
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) function loss which is one of 
the main ASTRID safety objectives.  
 
To reach this target, design is driven by deterministic 
safety criteria, probabilistic safety indicators and proper 
technical and economic analysis.  
 
Safety demonstration aims at identifying common cause 
failures and imposes to search for proper diversification 
of decay heat removal systems. In ASTRID, DHRS main 
diversification is based on final heat sinks types and 
intermediate coolant fluids. It is also based on spatial 
segregation of systems which leads to thermal loading 
diversification during normal operation as well as severe 
accident exposure. Implication of two different designers 
bodies framatome and a Japanese team (JAEA, 
Mitsubishi FBR Systems (MFBR) and MHI) also 
participate to diversification. 
 
This paper is giving an update concerning ASTRID DHR 
strategy with description of reference architecture 
evolution and project objectives. In particular, new 
developments were made for DHR during normal 
shutdown and role of Ex-Vessel system.  A special focus is 
made on design process of automatic shutter to 
hydraulically connect Hot Plenum and cold plenum to 
enhance primary vessel natural convection. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I.A. ASTRID project [1] 
 
        ASTRID (Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor 
for Industrial Demonstration) is a 1500MWth Sodium-
cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) pool type representative of 
what should be future high-powered industrial Sodium-
cooled Fast Reactors. ASTRID is under development in 
France to qualify innovative options relative to safety and 
operability.  
 
I.B. CEA/AREVA JAEA/MHI/MFBR 
collaboration [2] 
 
        Launched in 2014, French-Japan collaboration on 
ASTRID project is active both in reactor design and R&D 
fields (fuel technology, material science, instrumentation, 
sodium technology and severe accidents) with more than 
25 “task sheets”. 
 
For current collaboration, design task sheets focuses on 
the following systems: 
• Curie Point Electro-magnets for passive control 
rod systems, 
• Para-seismic pads, 
• Decay Heat Removal Systems (DHRS). 
 
Collaboration on DHRS is an important challenge with an 
impact on: 
• Safety analyses,  
• Primary vessel design, 
• General layout design and mounting operations, 
• General systems design: Air Heat eXchanger 
(AHX), Direct Heat eXchanger (DHX), draining 
system etc. 
 
 
  
I.C. Decay Heat Removal issue 
 
After reactor shutdown, heat coming from decay of 
unstable fission products and actinides still account for a 
few percent of nominal power which can be sufficient for 
a core melt if Decay Heat Removal (DHR) function is not 
properly managed. 
Consequently, DHR function is one of the fundamental 
safety functions; loss of DHR was at the origin of Three-
Miles Island and Fukushima Daiichi severe accidents.  
For ASTRID the objective is to ensure the practical 
elimination of DHR loss “The demonstration of practical 
elimination of accident sequences which could lead to 
large or early radioactive releases will be based, as far as 
necessary, on detailed deterministic and/or probabilistic 
studies.” 
Deterministic demonstration is based, at system design 
stage on appropriate redundancy and diversification of 
systems (see §II.A and §II.B).  
Probabilistic demonstration [3] is based on detailed 
description of DHR systems through fault tree and event 
tree modelling. Statistical branching of possible events 
that could lead to DHR loss allows the estimation of 
overall frequency which has to be extremely low (10-7 per 
year is a target). 
 
 
 
 
 
II. REMINDER OF ASTRID DHR FEATURES 
 
As shown in Fig 2, three types or systems contribute to 
this function. 
• Normal Energy Conversion System (ECS) via 
the main secondary loops with additional heat 
sink for long term cooling 
• Two diverse Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling 
Systems (DRACS), named RRA and RRB 
• Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System 
(RVACS), named RRC 
During normal shutdown conditions, main secondary 
sodium loops associated to ECS and dedicated heat sink 
will achieve the DHR function.  For incidental and 
accidental situation DHR function is achieved by the two 
DRACS and the RVACS only. 
DRACS and RVACS are designed (see II.A) taking into 
account safety constraints and economic constraints  
(limitation of primary vessel sizing, impact on building 
layout, minimization of costs of systems). 
 
Both RRA and RRB are designed in compliance with 
single failure criterion and have, as described in §II.B.1, 
an extensive level of diversification between each other. 
RRC is even furtherly diversified (see II.B.2) but its 
overall efficiency is lower than the one of each DRACS. 
 
II.A. In-vessel DHR Systems 
 
For both RRA and RRB, the heat from the core is directly 
removed from primary sodium through in-vessel Direct 
Heat eXchanger (DHX) (see Fig 2 below). Those two 
systems mainly differ with their operational modes. One 
requires electrical power to operate (RRA) and the other 
can operate in natural circulation (RRB). Consequences 
on overall loop design essentially reside in the design of 
  
sodium-Air Heat eXchanger (AHX) which requires an 
active air fan in the case of RRA when RRB only relies 
on naturally driven sodium and air convections. On the 
downside, the latter is only possible thanks to dedicated 
chimneys with greater sensitivity to some external 
hazards (see Fig 1 and Fig.4). 
Another significant diversification between both systems 
is in-vessel DHX location (see Fig 3). RRA DHX is 
located in reactor vessel cold plenum and RRB DHX is 
located in hot plenum. Main advantages of the RRA DHX 
location are: 
• Lower thermal loading during normal operation 
(operation at 400°C) than the ones of RRB DHX 
(550°C) 
• Diverse response in case of hypothetical 
mechanical energy release during severe accident 
• Improved core catcher cooling during severe 
accident 
 
II.B. Ex-vessel DHRS description 
 
RRC system (see Fig 5) is located around safety vessel in 
the reactor pit. Transfer of heat from primary sodium is 
based on radiating process of both main vessel and safety 
vessels (relying on steel emissivity). Because of its 
location, RRC is not sensitive to the potential 
consequences of severe accident. Also, secondary cooling 
fluid is oil which brings further diversification with 
DRACS. Tertiary cooling fluid is water with cooling 
tower as final heat sink. This system is available for long 
term cooling of reactor structure after severe accident but 
also as back up of in-vessel systems after few days of 
shutdown. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Presentation of ASTRID Decay Heat Removal 
Systems: RRA, RRB and RRC 
 
 
Fig. 3: RRA and RRB Decay Heat Exchangers 
(DHX). In RRA case, DHX is crossing the inner 
vessel belongs to cold plenum  
  
Fig. 4: RRA and RRB loops; RRB is a passive DHRS 
characterized by chimneys (in blue color) 
 
 
Fig. 5: RRC Ex-Vessel Decay Heat Exchangers 
around safety vessel 
 
  
III NEW DEVELLOPEMENTS OF ASTRID DHRS  
 
II.A. DHR during normal shutdown  
 
II.A.1. Former strategy and limitations  
 
In former strategy, Energy Conversion System (ECS) was 
used for DHR up to 3 days after reactor shutdown. 
Duration was mainly limited by constraints on heat sink 
sizing with low power output as well as turbine 
maintenance constraints. As a matter of fact, procedure to 
guarantee sufficient availability of Turbine (at least one) 
was considered as not realistic and too complex to 
guarantee high reliability. Also, possibility to extract low 
power with “normal“ cooling tower could require 
technology changes (modular cooling etc.) and was not 
studied in Conceptual Design  phase. 
After 3 days, In-vessel DHRS (RRA and RRB) were used 
for normal DHR. Limitation of this strategy was 
highlighted when studying operating conditions dealing 
with sodium system maintenance: In some maintenance 
cases, the only remaining DHRS could be RRC. These 
conditions have an impact either on RRC performance 
(see §II.B.1) or on maintenance needs for Sodium DHR 
system (related to regulation consideration not described 
in this paper). 
 
 
II.A.2. Tertiary system design  
 
For procedure simplification sake and because previous 
strategy was carrying some associated risks (see II.A.1), 
auxiliary system used for Sodium-Gas Heat Exchanger 
(SGHE) preheating was modified to also ensure cooling 
during normal shutdown: additional heat sink based on 
gas/water heat exchanger was implemented (see Fig 6) . 
This option was preferred to using existing coolers of 
Rankine cycle (to prevent further complexification of 
main gas system) although operating flexibility is lower 
(necessity of isolation valves on normal circuit with some 
operating conditions constraints) 
 
 
 
Fig 6: Cooling circuit for normal operation 
 
II.B. Role of ex-vessel system 
 
II.B.1. Development target 
 
Several drivers are pushing for Ex-Vessel system 
performance increase: 
1. Contribution as back-up during In-Vessel 
systems maintenance situations (see II.A.1) 
2. Capacity to handle DHR at any time during 
severe accident 
3. RRC capacity is a strong driver of long term 
DHR reliability highlighted by Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) studies  
4. High performance RRC could lead to 
simplification of  global DHRS 
 
1. As seen in II.A.1, RRC capacities are conditioning 
possibility to perform In-vessel DHRS maintenance. 
In Conceptual Design phase these capacities were too 
low to manage normal shutdown (including refueling 
plus DHR maintenance) within reasonable time 
frame (significantly less than 30 days). The reason 
behind is that Safety objectives aim at maintaining 
equivalent number of line of defense in all normal 
operation conditions. In other words, maintenance of 
DHRS should not weaken DHR safety margins. 
As a consequence, maintenance of main DHR 
systems can only occur when Residual power has 
sufficiently decreased so that Ex-vessel system is a 
credible back-up. 
 
2. Reference RRC Heat transfer capacities are not 
sufficient to handle core catcher cooling in all 
situations. Consequently, RRC is associated with a 
sodium circuit capable of filling gas space between 
main and safety vessels. Implementation of this 
procedure during severe accident is used within 
safety demonstration despite remaining challenges to 
demonstrate feasibility in all situations. 
As a consequence, in-vessel systems were also used 
within Severe Accident management procedure for 
situations corresponding to mechanical energy 
release. This design constraint for in vessel DHRS 
DHX is quite significant and has an impact on other 
demonstrations (seismic, life time justification etc.).  
 
3. PSA studies with capacities to model component 
repair are under development within ASTRID project 
(Dynamic PSA [4]). Preliminary results show that 
RRC performance increase is a strong driver for long 
term DHR reliability. As a matter of fact Oil circuit is 
considered as almost fully repairable. Beside, 
reliability data of conventional oil circuit components 
are easier to assess than those of sodium circuits 
components. 
  
4. Last but not least, feasibility of Ex-vessel DHR with 
similar capacities as in-vessel system is the ultimate 
goal leading to a possible simplification of DHRS 
architecture (not described in this paper). 
 
II.B.2. Insight of technological solutions 
 
3 types of solutions are studied to reach development 
target, some of these solutions can be “twinned” to reach 
high performance system.  
• Emissivity increase of vessels 
• Contact cooling of safety vessel with heat 
exchanger 
• Direct contact cooling with fluid 
 
II.C. Development of automated closable connection 
between hot and cold plenum  
 
The objective of automated closable connection is to 
enhance core cooling by having an additional flow path in 
case all primary pumps lose their function. As matter of 
fact because of low position of DHX within reactor block, 
design case for RRA implies either pony motor operation 
or RRB driven natural convection.  
 
II.C.1. Principle of systems 
 
Two kinds of systems have been considered, “RRA-DHX 
shutter” and “plug on inner vessel”  
 
The concept of the RRA-DHX shutter is shown in Fig 8. 
The communication line between hot and cold plenum is 
put though the DHX of RRA. In other word, this RRA 
design has a penetration type DHX which have sodium 
intakes in hot pool and shutter mechanism. In addition 
feasibilities of other concept such as “Gas shutter” 
involving no moving component have been studied. In 
this concept, in order to cut the communication line in 
normal power operation, sodium coolant level is pushed 
down by Ar gas pressure. 
 
Concerning plug on inner-vessel (Fig 7), concept is 
derived from Super Phenix mechanical plugs used for 
sodium filling and inspection. New features is “fail safe” 
automated opening with high level of confidence on 
actuation capability. 
 
Through the comparison study among proposed optional 
design, the concept of plug on inner-vessel has been 
selected as the reference system. Main reasons are that 
plug solution implementation has generally the lowest 
impact on reactor roof layout, thermal loadings on RRA-
DHX and other safety demonstration. 
 
 
Fig 7: solution with plug shutter on inner-vessel (in 
Blue) 
 
 
Fig 8: solution with mechanical shutter on RRA 
chimney (in blue) 
 
II.C.2. Impact on RRA operation without primary 
pumping 
 
In order to evaluate impact of closable connection on 
RRA performance, following study case is considered:  
• Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) 
• RRB operation neglected 
• One RRA circuit operating 
Additional trip of primary pumps pony motor when 
temperature reaches 600°C can be considered so that 
primary circuit is operating under natural circulation 
mode. Automated hydraulic connection is opened on pony 
motor trip signal. Results are shown on Fig 9 (case with 
DHX-Shutter is illustrated). 
 
 
Fig 9: Thermal transient of NC onset under 1 RRA DHR 
conditions. RRA’ correspond to RRA plus Shutter-DHX   
  
In reference case (grey curve) natural convection in 
primary circuit with RRA operation is not sufficient. In 
case additional flow path opening is triggered, satisfactory 
natural convection takes place (red curve). 
 
II.C.3. Impact on Natural convection onset 
 
This study shows the impact of additional hydraulic 
connection opening on Station Black Out (SBO) transient 
(design option with plug on inner vessel is illustrated). In 
simulated case, following conditions are considered: 
• Pump trip at t=0 
• Thermal flux through main cooling circuit is 
instantaneously canceled (no thermal inertia) 
• No DHR system are considered for short term 
operation 
 
Results are shown on Fig 10. Core outlet temperatures are 
presented: each curve of same color represent one 
hydraulic zone gathering several fuel assembly channels. 
Opening of additional hydraulic connection between hot 
and cold plenum lowers temperature peaks of roughly 
150°C increasing core temperature margins. 
 
 
Fig 10: SBO transient without secondary loop inertia: 
cases with and without additional hydraulic connection 
between hot and cold plenum (plug on inner vessel 
option) 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Jointly developed by a French and Japanese design 
team, ASTRID decay heat removal systems are based on 
an adequate application of defense in depth principle with 
highlights by probabilistic assessment.  
Diversification is the key point of ASTRID design with 
three types of systems in complement to the normal DHR 
system by ECS, which contribute to the robustness of the 
practical elimination demonstration. Option selection 
process of type of DHR systems and number of loops was 
also driven and confirmed by static probabilistic 
assessment 
Latest developments are presented in this paper with 
modification of DHR strategy during normal shutdown, 
increase of ex-vessel cooling capacities and enhancement 
of natural convection capacities with automated plug on 
inner-vessel. 
Next step is to confirm Ex-vessel system role within 
practical elimination demonstration and consolidate role 
of automated plug opening within operating conditions. 
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